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1. Introduction 
 
Organisational choice recognises the inter-activity between individuals in their roles as 
members of organisations such as households, businesses and community groups and 
networks. As such, a whole new layer of interaction and influence is introduced into 
travel behaviour research that compounds the complexity of problem definition, model 
specification, data collection and analysis.  
 
There are many dimensions of inter-activity. These include preference interactions, 
constraint interactions and expectation interactions (Manski 2000) that can be passive or 
active (by observation or direct participatory influence). Empirically, interactivity can 
take many forms, synthesised into three main types: endogenous interactions (the 
propensity of an agent to act in some way varies with the behaviour of the group), 
contextual interactions in which the propensity of an agent to behave in some way 
varies with exogenous characteristics (including perceived influence) of the group 
members, and correlated effects wherein agents in the same group tend to behave 
similarly (to varying degrees or correlation) because they have similar individual 
characteristics or face similar institutional environments (Manski 2000, 127).  These 
hint at a modelling representation.  
 
A big challenge is the recognition of the presence of endogeneity due to reflection. For 
example, the average behaviour of the group is itself determined by the behaviour of 
group members. Establishing the direction(s) of influence and the role of each agent (eg 
leaders and/or followers) is very important in formulating the interactivity. Sequential 
versus simultaneous negotiation is especially relevant. The papers by Arora and Allenby 
(1999) and Dellaert et al (1998) that study influence provide one appealing empirical 
approach (see below). The social psychology literature on social grouping (eg Levine 
and Moreland 1998) provides broad guidelines on ways in which agents interact in 
small groups. Although there is a large literature focussed on game theory to study 
interactions between agents in a decision-chain, this literature has not offered practical 
ways of modelling the behavioural relationships of interest to the study of traveller 
behaviour (see Bernstein (1996) for an excellent overview of game theory and its 
relevance to decision-making). Brewer and Hensher (2000) and Rose and Hensher 
(2002) offer one empirical approach that recognises notions of cooperation and non-
cooperation, trust, feedback, expectation and timing (sequential vs simultaneous group 
preference and choice). The latter appears to be one of only two transport paper in 
which two or more agents are represented endogenously in a choice revealing process1. 
Gliebe and Koppelman (2002) have recently modelled joint activity participation of 
adult household members through simultaneous representation of each decisions 
maker’s decisions concerning independent activity participation, allocation of time to 
joint activities, and the interplay between individual and joint activities.  
 
                                                          
1 Colleagues in econometrics and marketing at the University of Sydney advise me that this comment 
applies broadly to the literature in economics and marketing. Although there is a large literature in the 
sociological and administrative sciences on agency networks (see Stevenson and Greenberg 2000 for one 
excellent example), this literature focuses on structural relationships using correlation measures of 
performance. The choice modelling paradigms popular in travel behaviour research are typically absent 
(although see Podolny 1994 for an exception, using logistics regression to study exchange partners in the 
investment sector).  
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This paper reflects on a number of issues involved in modelling joint decisions, both 
within and between households and firms. Important questions include: What modelling 
approaches have been tried? Whom do we need to interview and how, in particular in 
firms? How do we find them and quantify their preferences and choices?  Examples 
include employee-employer, household partners, and shipper-forwarder interactive 
agents.  
 
 
2. The Idea of Interactive Agents – Defining Relational 
Structures in Networks 
 
No household or business is an island (Håkansson and Snehota 1989, Stevenson and 
Greenberg 2000). The reality is that households and firms exist and develop an identity 
based on the relations they build with other households and firms, either directly as 
suppliers or customers, or indirectly as collaborators or as competitors. To treat 
households and firms as atomistic entities making all their decisions for themselves, as 
is so often the approach in mainstream economic analysis (with the exception of the 
industrial organization literature using game theory) and in much management and 
transport analysis, is a serious violation of reality. Thus a central motivation herein is to 
explore ways in which we can treat households and firms as interconnected in large or 
small, tight or diffuse networks – as is the reality for most households and firms in 
actual economies. The dynamics of household and firms’ relations – the creation of 
linkages, their modification or rupture, and the patterns formed – become a central focus 
of interest in the network view.2  The management of relations also becomes a factor in 
households and firms’ success of equal significance with the management of internal 
operations.3 Relations, like resources and routines, can only be changed slowly. Thus 
households and firms can be caught in networks that represent a threat to survival if the 
network as a whole is losing competitiveness. The reality of inter- and intra-firm and 
inter- and intra-household relations must be brought into focus, without making the 
mistake of claiming that network structures are always advantageous. 
 
2.1 Identifying interactivity alternatives 
 
Although we might focus a lot on how loose or tight networks or groups actually make 
choices and the influence on each member, an important pre-issue is establishing how 
groups are actually constructed in the first place. That is, what type of inter-activity is 
preferred by an individual that results in the establishment of a group and a structure of 
individuals influence? This seems like a very good starting position and indeed is one 
that especially needs addressing in the context of freight travel choices. In this specific 
context, the formation of alliances in a supply chain seems important in establishing 
preferred inter-activity. We detail this later in Section 7. We propose (at least) eight 
                                                          
2 See, for example, the major works of the Scandinavian “markets-as-networks” school, to be discussed 
below. 
3 In like manner, Kale, Singh and Perlmutter (2000) refer to “relational capital” as being enhanced 
through firms enacting relations with each other in networks, while Dunning (2000) refers to firms’ 
“relational assets” to make a similar point. These assets can only be productively employed by one firm 
interacting with another firm. 
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alternative group or network strategies4 that can be modelled to establish criteria for 
membership. These are set out below.  
 
Autocratic or directive style (ADS): A lead agent defines and diagnoses the task, 
generates, evaluates and chooses among alternative solutions. 
 
Autocratic with group information input (AGI): A lead agent defines the task. Although 
the leader diagnoses the cause of the problem, they may use the network as an 
information source in obtaining data to determine cause. Using a list of potential 
solutions, the lead agent may once again obtain data from the group in evaluation of 
these alternatives and make a choice among them.  
 
Autocratic with group's review and feedback (AGRF): A lead agent defines the task, 
diagnoses its causes, and selects a solution. They then present a plan to the group for 
understanding, review, and feedback.  
 
Individual Consultative Style (ICS): A lead agent defines the task and shares this 
definition with individual members of a participating network The leader solicits ideas 
regarding problem causes and potential solutions. The lead agent may also use the 
expertise of particular individuals in evaluation of alternative solutions. Once this 
information is obtained, the leader makes the choice of which alternative solution to 
implement.  
 
Group Consultative Style (GCS): Same as ICS except the lead agent shares their 
definition of the task with the group as a whole.  
 
Group Decision Style (GDS): A lead agent shares their definition of the task with the 
participating group. The network them proceeds to diagnose the causes. Following 
diagnosis, the group generates, evaluates, and chooses among solutions.  
 
Participative Style (PS): The group as a whole proceeds through the entire decision 
making process. The group defines the task and performs all other functions as a group. 
The role of the lead agent is that of process facilitator.  
 
Leaderless Team (LT): The group has no formal leader, but rather is assembled as a 
leaderless team. If no substitute for task leadership, or process leadership is present, a 
process leader often emerges. This person may change from task to task. The group 
generates its own task definition, performs its own diagnosis, generates alternatives, and 
chooses among alternatives.  
 
Identification of the role and influence of each agent in an organisation’s choice making 
seems a logical first stage in the definition of the empirical setting within which to study 
and model such choices. What we have is a segmentation based on participatory 
influence on an organisation’s choice outcomes; however this segmentation is crucial in 
determining what role each member plays in decision making so that their input (ie 
influence, power, preferences) can appropriately be represented. A nested logit model is 
one appealing model setting to reveal the probability of participation style of a group. 
From this framework we can establish the participants in further data collection in 
                                                          
4 The terms or phrases, ‘network, ‘group, decision-network’, decision-chain’ and ‘supply-chain’ are 
essentially substitutable definers of agency interactivity.  
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which the study of choice amongst alternative outcomes is the focus. As detailed in a 
later section, such a framework is essential in freight studies where the participants in 
the supply chain are quite extensive although many may have little influence on the 
choice outcome(s). However to a priori exclude specific participants without a formal 
inclusion/exclusion process is not desirable.  All members of the decision-chain are 
assumed to bring to the choice process an implicit probability of participation which is a 
reflection of an agents influence, power and preferences. The analysts task is to reveal 
this probability empirically. 
 
  
3. The Concept of Influence of Group Members at the 
Attribute and Overall Evaluation Level 
 
Arora and Allenby (1999), Dellaert et al (1998), Aribarg et al (2002) and Brock, W.A. 
and Durlauf, S. (2002) are recent examples of research efforts to incorporate the 
individual’s preferences and influence in group decisions. Key to their approach is the 
idea of influence patterns at the attribute level that condition the marginal utility of each 
attribute associated with each individual. This is designed to account for the intensity of 
influence of each participating individual on the contribution of each attribute in the 
group choice. The notion of attribute-specific influence of each individual recognises 
that each individual exerts differential influence on each attribute and not just on the 
overall preference intensity. Measuring this influence usually involves a stated influence 
or an outcome-based measure, the latter involving an allocation exercise. For example, 
Arora and Allenby asked each individual to allocate 100 points between themselves and 
other participating individuals with regard to the influence each would have in a 
decision to purchase an electric oven/range.  Dellaert et al use a different empirical 
strategy in which each individual not only reports their own preferences; they also 
project the preference of other members of the group making a decision. This 
information is used in a second round where the same experiment is repeated but an 
additional piece of information is now shown to each individual, namely the predicted 
preference scores of the other individual(s) of that individual’s preferences as they 
perceive them. The latter is the empirical data for establishing the influence parameters. 
 
These studies treat each other individual as an exogenous input whereas a more 
interactive approach such as in Brewer and Hensher (2000) and Rose and Hensher 
(2002) allow for feedback, revision and final decision. As Dellaert et al (2000, 144) 
state: ‘Future extensions could study the roles of individual family members in the 
family interaction (eg negotiating, bargaining, power differences) and the degree of 
influence individuals have in different stages of the family preference formation 
process’. The idea of relational trading seems central to the process.  
 
The influencing models can be estimated through the use of a number of discrete choice 
models including multivariate probit, nested covariate heterogeneity logit, mixed logit, 
and latent class segmentation in which the full hierarchical Bayesian specification can 
be modelled to identify the relative influence of each attribute for each individual in the 
group outcome. We discuss these specifications in the next section. 
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4. Integrating Interactive Agency Choices and 
Preferences  
 
Consider a situation in which we have two agents who interact to some extent in the 
determination of a choice outcome either of a cooperative or non-cooperative form. A 
cooperative outcome is one in which both agents agree (ie choose the same alternative). 
In earlier research Hensher introduced the notion of interactive agency choice 
experiments (IACE) (Brewer and Hensher 2000, Hensher and Chow 1999). An IACE 
involves two or more agents in sequential or simultaneous assessment of a common set 
of alternatives  (the interactive choice set) with a series of rounds of assessment in 
which each party reviews the alternatives and makes a choice. Agreement can occur 
immediately, after a few rounds or not at all over the permissible number of rounds 
before the IACE concludes. The empirical process is discussed in some detail below. In 
this section we suggest how various discrete choice model frameworks can be used to 
capture the influence of interactivity between agents in the choice process (including the 
formation of preferences) that produce what we call the ‘equilibrium’ choice outcome 
(be it cooperative or non-cooperative). The ability to see how individual agents might 
modify their preferences as a result of the preferences of other agents is an important 
feature of the approach since it is a reflection of what actually happens in reality.  
 
To formalise a model system to capture the interactivity, a number of possibilities exist. 
Four in particular are worthy of assessment – multivariate probit, mixed logit (or 
multinomial probit), and covariance heterogeneity (nested) logit.  In presenting these 
specifications, we assume that the relationships between agents are contemporaneous 
(in contrast to lagged). All three model specifications allow for some degree of 
contemporaneous correlation depending on how the alternatives associated with each 
agent are represented in the equation system.  These models can be implemented either 
separately for each of the eight interactive profiles in section 2.1 or by conditioning 
them on the membership of the eight strategy groups. In the latter case we would need 
to establish a conditional probability of group membership as well as a choice 
probability for a specific choice outcome for each agent.  
 
Multivariate probit is a system of binary choice equations where each equation can be 
assigned to an alternative and an agent. Each equation is of the form y*im = βm’xim +  
εim ; m=1,…,M;  yim = 1 if y*im > 0, and 0 otherwise; εim, m=1,…,M, are distributed as 
multivariate normal with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix R with diagonal elements 
equal to 1.0. Correlation between the agents and alternatives is captured through the 
covariance matrix. Data measuring the influence of one agent on another agent (as is 
Dellaert et al 1998) is introduced as one or more exogenous variables. Thus if we have 
three agents each involved in the evaluation of the same three alternatives, we would 
have nine equations. We might anticipate greater correlation across the equations 
defined on the same alternative.  
 
Covariance heterogeneity is a modification of a nested logit model in which the 
inclusive value (IV) parameters are functions of exogenous variables. We treat the 
nested structure along similar lines to the combining of two data sources (eg RP-SP) 
from the single agent to reveal scale differences between data sources. However the 
contrast is between data sources associated with the same choice set but two (or more) 
agents involved in the same choice setting. The scale (or inverse standard deviation) 
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parameter provides a measure of the influence of unobserved effects parameterised by 
contextual variables including data measuring the influence of one agent on another 
agent’s choice.  
 
The mixed logit model (see Hensher and Greene 2002, Train 2002) allows us to 
represent agents (ie observations) that interact to be correlated through the specification 
of choice sets and alternatives in choice sets.  Agency interaction is analogous to 
multiple choice sets for stated choice modelling associated with each individual, and 
since such observations are (potentially) correlated, we can think of the interactive agent 
problem as nothing more than potentially correlated observations. Each identical 
alternative across agents can have identical (ie generic) parameters or unique (ie 
alternative-specific) parameters. Each observation is defined by a set of alternatives in a 
choice set, a choice outcome and a set of alternative, agent and context-specific 
attributes. Some of these context-specific attributes can be related to the preference 
function of the other interactive agent (s).  We now detail how interactivity might 
formally be revealed. 
 
In proposing a mixed logit framework for capturing the interactivity between agents we 
need to clarify the options available for specifying the relationships between the choices 
of each agent. There are essentially five alternative behavioural specifications (Table 1) 
of which specification C is particularly attractive.  We view each agent in a choice 
outcome as participating in a contemporaneous way. Each agent brings to the choice 
table a set of clearly defined influences as measured by attributes of alternatives, but in 
addition they also carry unmeasured factors that are sources of unobserved variability 
(often described as unobserved heterogeneity and accommodated by random effects). 
Such variability plays a very large role in the interactive process leading to choice 
outcomes that are both cooperative and non-cooperative. It is also assumed that an 
agent’s preferences can influence the choices made by other agents and indirectly leads 
to review and revision (or maintenance) of preferences for specific alternatives.  
 
Table 1.  Alternative ways of Representing Interactivity between Agent 
 
Specification Contemporaneous 
Correlation 
Random 
Effects 
AR1 
Process 
 q=1,…Q agents; 
i=1,…j,…I alternatives 
A x x x eiq iid 
B ✓  x x eiq independent across 
agents, generalised 
deviation from IIA 
C ✓  ✓  x eiq = ηiq + εiq  with cov 
(ηiq , ηjq), εiq is IIA 
D ✓  x ✓  eiq = ρiei,q-1 +  ηiq ηiq is 
IIA 
E ✓  ✓  ✓  C plus D 
 
Formally the interactive agency choice problem associated with specification C in Table 
1 is given in equation (1).  
 
Uiq’ =f(Uq’ , Uq’’) = Vq’ + eq’ = Vq’+ (ηiq’ + εiq’); ηiq’ = αXq’ + ϕVq’’    (1) 
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Where: 
 
Uq’  =  utility function associated with agent q’ for alternative i 
Uq’’  =  utility function associated with agent q’’ for alternative i 
Vq’  = observed components of the utility function associated with agent q’ for  
alternative i 
eq’   =  unobserved components of the utility function associated with agent q’  
for alternative i 
εiq’ =  IID component on the unobserved effects which is IID over the  
alternatives and does not depend on underlying parameters or data. 
ηiq’  =  the random term with mean zero whose distribution over agents and 
alternative depends on underlying parameters and observed data relating 
to alternative I and individual q’. 
αXq’ =  the parameterised exogenous attributes related to agent q’ 
ϕVq’’ =  the parameterised preference function for agent q’’ that represents the  
contemporaneous interactivity between agents.  
 
The unobserved effects can be correlated amongst alternatives in a given choice set. 
One way to recognise this is to permit correlation of attributes that are common across 
alternatives. This engenders a covariance matrix with off-diagonal estimates identifying 
the dependency of one attribute on another within and between alternatives (depending 
on whether the attribute parameters are generic or alternative-specific).  It also has 
interesting ramifications for correlated choice sets. 
 
Let us define the utility expression for each alternative as Uqit=ßqXqit+εqit. Since ßq is 
random, it can be rewritten as ßq=ß+uq where ß is fixed (ie the mean) and uq is the 
deviation from the mean. Then Uqit=ßqXqit+ (uq Xqit +εqit). There is correlation over 
alternatives because Uq is the same for all alternatives. That is, each agents’s 
preferences are used in the evaluation of the alternatives. This indicates that Cov[(uq Xqit 
+εqit), (uq Xqis +εqis)] equals5 σ2 (uq)*Xqit*Xqis where σ2 (uq) is the variance of uq. In 
addition, however, there is also correlation over choice sets (or agents) for each 
alternative because uq is the same in each choice set (or agent’s choice set). Again 
another way of stating this is that each agent uses the same preferences to evaluate 
(relative) utilities in each choice set (or agent’s choice set). Thus Cov[(uq Xqit +εqit), (uq 
Xqis +εqis)] equals σ2 (uq)*Xqit*Xqis. The behavioural implication is that random 
preferences induce correlation over alternatives and choice sets within and between 
agents.  
 
Thus both correlated alternatives and interactive agent’s choice sets usually go hand in 
hand (assuming that one identifies the set of choice sets associated with each agent)6. 
Correlation over alternatives and not over interactive agent choice sets could however 
be established by specifying utility as Uqit=ßqtXqit+εqit where ßqt represents preferences 
instead of ßq. Thus preferences vary over agents and over choice sets with ßqt 
independent over choice sets for each agent. This is likely to be an unreasonable 
assumption for most situations. In particular, preferences might vary over choice sets for 
                                                          
5 Sigma is the standard deviation for the normal and lognormal and the spread for the uniform and 
triangular distributions. 
6 The only circumstance in which you can distinguish correlated choice sets from correlated alternatives is 
by ignoring the dependency between choice sets or assume that it does not exist. 
Models of Organisational and Agency Choices for Passenger and Freight-Related Travel Choices: 
Notions of Inter-Activity and Influence 
Hensher 
 
8 
each individual, but it is doubtful that they are independent over choice sets for each 
sampled individual. If there is some correlation in preferences over choice sets for each 
individual, then random parameters implies correlation over choice sets and over 
alternatives. In general, the mixed logit model can accommodate (i) correlation over 
alternatives and not over choice sets by assuming ßqt is IID over choice sets, or (ii) 
correlation across choice sets but not over alternatives by fixing all of the parameters 
except those representing the alternative-specific constants (ASC’s) and assuming that 
ASC parameters are IID over alternatives but the same for each individual across the 
choice sets (see Hensher and Greene 2002). 
 
We now have a number of alternative econometric frameworks within which to 
represent the choice process of agents who are influenced by the choices and 
preferences of other agents in a contemporaneous way. Rose and Hensher (2002) 
revisited an enhanced data set from the telecommuting study reported in Brewer and 
Hensher (2000) to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of each of the methods 
outlined above7. The next task is to take a closer look at the empirical framework within 
which we can quantify the formation of an equilibrium set of preferences and choices.  
 
 
5. Interactive Agency Choice: A Conceptual and 
Empirical Process  
 
Agents interact at various stages in the decision making process ((Podolny 1994). 
Agents bring different perspectives and influence (as suggested in a previous section) to 
the formation of preferences and in the final (or ‘equilibrium’) choice outcome. The 
equilibrium choice outcome can be one of cooperation or non-cooperation, with the 
latter outcome helping to reveal the set of constraints that deny cooperation.  
 
To illustrate how agents interact in the decision-making process, we propose a very 
general framework in which both sequential and simultaneous preference formation and 
choice outcomes are established. The empirical process is very similar for sequential 
and simultaneous assessment, although the sequential process presents an opportunity to 
add richness in the details that are revealed by each agent in the interactive choice 
process.  It also adds a great deal of complexity as the number of agents increases since 
the order sequences increase exponentially. To simplify the sequential process to a 
manageable dimension, some rules may have to be introduced. One potentially useful 
rule is to structure the sequence according to the influence of each agent. This is a topic 
for future research. 
 
We will assume that a previous stage in the decision making process has identified the 
relevant set of decision makers, their relative influence and the probability of a specific 
interactivity-alternative profile existing in the sampled population. The latter is crucial 
for predictions. The focus in this section is on the mechanism for structuring the 
interactive empirical process leading to choice outcomes, based on an interactivity-
                                                          
7 We have collected additional data and re-analysed the interactive agency choice of distributed work 
practices for a sample of 60 pairs of employees and employers, using the more advanced statistical 
methods in the text. The earlier work by Brewer and Hensher (2000) used sequenced multinomial logit 
models.  
 
Models of Organisational and Agency Choices for Passenger and Freight-Related Travel Choices: 
Notions of Inter-Activity and Influence 
Hensher 
9 
alternative profile of two agents (interacting as autocratic with group's review and 
feedback – ie AGRF). With two agents there may be no natural ordering and thus two 
sequences may be appropriate. Furthermore, each agent in the preference formation 
process may initially have no knowledge of the other agent’s preferences. This will be 
revealed through the consultation process via feedback of choice responses and/or 
explicit statements on the role of specific attributes.  
 
To give some structure to the empirical process we will assume that a stated choice 
experiment pivoted around existing experience is an appropriate setting for revealing 
preferences and choices. Given two agents, we assume that the starting order of the 
interactive agency choice experiment (IACE) has been randomised (but that order 
sequence can and should be tested in model estimation). In Brewer and Hensher (2000) 
and Rose and Hensher (2002) we assumed a priori that the employee is ordered in the 
sequence before the employer in the assessment of distributed work alternatives. At the 
commencement of an IACE, it is reasonable to assume that each agent has a varying 
amount of knowledge of the other agent(s) preferences and a view on the influence of 
each agent. Indeed there is a continuum of knowledge and influence that is postulated to 
impact on the formation of preferences and the resulting choices made by each agent. At 
one extreme, we might posit no knowledge and no idea of relative influence; at the other 
extreme we might have full (perceived) knowledge and a precise view on agent 
influence.  
 
The priors we suggest setting at the commencement of the IACE are (i) group strategy 
membership (ii) level of knowledge of other agent(s) position on specific attributes and 
outcomes, and (iii) perception of relative degree of influence of each agent in the 
decision-making process. This last element is linked to (i) in that membership of a 
group strategy suggests part of the profile of the influence structure; however in (i) the 
relative influence of each agent is not formally quantified. As the rounds of interactive 
review, choice, review, revision etc progress the level of knowledge and influence may 
change for each agent. Thus it is important to revisit the set of questions at each stage 
(or round) in the IACE that establish knowledge and influence. Schematically we 
present the IACE process in Table 2 for agents AGT1 and AGT2. 
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Table 2. The IACE structure  
(an example based on 48 observations, 3 alternatives and 2 agents) 
 
Groups Choice sets Agree 
Number
Agree Pass Not Agree 
Number not 
agree 
48 1 set     0 
2 sets    0 
3 sets    3 
Alt 1 
Alt 2 
Alt 3 
26 
30 
32 
Pass 1 
AGT 1                AGT2 
R1                          R2 
Alt 1–Alt 2 
Alt 1–Alt 3 
Alt 2–Alt 1 
Alt 2–Alt 3 
Alt 3–Alt 1 
Alt 3–Alt 2 
6 
8 
8 
8 
11 
15 
31 1 set     11 
2 sets   15 
3 sets    5 
Alt 1 
Alt 2 
Alt 3 
8 
10 
9 
Pass 2 
AGT 1                AGT2 
R3                           R4 
Alt 1–Alt 2 
Alt 1–Alt 3 
Alt 2–Alt 1 
Alt 2–Alt 3 
Alt 3–Alt 1 
Alt 3–Alt 2 
3 
7 
4 
0 
7 
8 
19 1 set    11 
2 sets    6 
3 sets    2 
Alt 1 
Alt 2 
Alt 3 
10 
1 
6 
Pass 3 
AGT 1                AGT2 
R5                           R6 
 
Alt 1–Alt 2 
Alt 1–Alt 3 
Alt 2–Alt 1 
Alt 2–Alt 3 
Alt 3–Alt 1 
Alt 3–Alt 2 
0 
0 
2 
1 
6 
3 
7 1 set      4 
2 sets    1 
3 sets    2 
Alt 1 
Alt 2 
Alt 3 
0 
1 
1 
Pass 4 
AGT 1                AGT2 
R7                           R8 
 
Alt 1–Alt 2 
Alt 1–Alt 3 
Alt 2–Alt 1 
Alt 2–Alt 3 
Alt 3–Alt 1 
Alt 3–Alt 2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
6 
2 
 
The sequential nature of the IACE can be summarised as a series of rounds with each 
set of rounds associated with one stated choice set. In Rose and Hensher (2002) the 
following structure was adopted (with 50% of the sample of employers being given 
knowledge of the employees choice responses in the first round), but with no 
measurement of influence. 
 
• Four sequential interactive choice experiments were administered to a sample of 
employees and their employers. 
 
• In Round 1, the employee (AGT1) is first selected and interviewed in respect of a 
predefined set of distributed work opportunities.  
 
• Round 2, the immediate supervisor (as the employer’s representative – AGT2) is 
asked to make an offer to the employee in the context of the same choice 
experiment but under two information scenarios - with and without knowledge of 
the employees preferred choice on each of three replications. 
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• Round 3: a set of first round supervisor responses is fed back to the employee for 
review. 
 
• In Round 4, the outcome is then fed back to the supervisor who re-evaluates their 
position in the face of the employees second-round response. The process 
continues using the same logic for further rounds. 
 
If the offer from the supervisor is accepted, that is the end of the process - a cooperative 
solution has been produced. If s/he rejects the offer, a stalemate is the outcome. A 
number of design strategies (summarised in Table 3) can be considered to take into 
account the set of agents. For illustration, we use an urban freight example involving a 
shipper and one or more freight forwarders (ie logistics providers), and assume three 
attributes (door to door travel time, consignment cost and reliability) each at three 
levels. The IACE might involve three choice designs (SCI, SCII, SCIII) 
 
Table 3. Design Strategies for IACE’s 
 
a. SCI: Shipper and single freight forwarder choice set fully interactive and evaluated 
simultaneously 
 
Alt 1 Alt2 Alt3 
time cost reliability time cost reliability time cost reliability 
 
b. SCII: This is the same as for SCI but treated sequentially with shipper choosing and 
then freight forwarder given knowledge of the shipper’s first round preferred offer 
 
c. SCIII: Interactive Logistics service providers choice sets 
Mixing the three logistics service provider attribute offers in a subset of alternatives.  
Shipper evaluates offers from three freight forwarders and then each freight forwarder 
reviews shippers preferred offer and provides feedback until a cooperative or non-
cooperative outcome. 
 
Alt 1 (L11|L21) Alt2 (L11|L22) Alt3 (L11|L23) 
 
time cost reliability time cost reliability time cost reliability
Alt 1 (L12|L21) 
 
Alt2 (L12|L22) Alt3 (L12|L23) 
 
time cost reliability Time cost reliability time cost reliability
Alt 1  (L13|L21) 
 
Alt2 (L13|L22) Alt3 (L13|L23) 
time cost reliability time cost reliability time cost reliability
Note: Lij|kl = ith (or kth) logistics service provider and jth (or lth) alternative 
 
These choice experiments will produce a set of expected utilities leading to the 
determination of (non-) cooperative choice probabilities associated with each mixture of 
outcomes evaluated by a logistics service provider and a shipper. The analysis of each 
pass in the interactive choice experiment can be represented as a recursive discrete 
choice paradigm in which the prior agent’s choice conditions the subsequent agent’s 
choice. The recursive structure embodies the shipper and the logistics service provider 
‘flip-flopping’ as the prior and subsequent agent in each round of the IACE. Sequential 
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estimation of each agent’s choice process at each pass in the sequential negotiation 
process will enable the analyst to track the choices made and their revisions up to the 
point of cooperation or experiment termination if there is no agreement after a 
predetermined number of rounds.  
 
5.1 A sequential recursive model estimation strategy 
 
Using the logistics service provider setting again, a series of discrete choice models can 
be estimated to evaluate potential influences on the shipper’s and the logistics service 
provider’s preference for the each of three offers. In addition to the design attributes, the 
role of contextual variables describing the shipper and the logistics service provider(s), 
as well as structural influences on the execution of the interactive agency choice 
experiment (IACE) can be included. The following steps highlight a possible sequential 
recursive estimation procedure for an experiment (with three replications), involving a 
shipper and one logistics service provider: 
 
• Step 1: First sequential move offer of shipper - three choice sets per shipper.  As 
the first experiment there is no involvement of the logistics service provider. 
Information is included on the perceived influence of the other agent(s). 
 
• Step 2: First sequential move offer of logistics service provider - the same three 
choice sets as per the shipper. The knowledge of the shipper’s offer is revealed to 
half of the logistics service providers only. We might include a variable 
representing the actual offer from the shipper for the subset who are informed of 
the shipper’s choice. If the shipper and logistics service provider agree on the 
offer in pass 1 for a specific replication, then that concludes the IACE for the 
agency pair. This state of negotiation is identified by a ‘pass agreement’ dummy 
variable (=1 if agree and 0 otherwise). At each step we seek information of the 
role played by each agent in influencing the outcome.  
 
• Step 3: Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the first 
sequential move offers. These influences include design attributes, individual 
characteristics and each agent’s perception of the opportunities and constraints 
associated with alternative offers.   
 
• Step 4: Calculate the expected utility matrix for the shipper and the logistics 
service provider and identify the cooperation probability for each alternative.  The 
non-cooperation probabilities for each off-diagonal pair of alternatives are also 
identified.  
 
• Step 5: Second sequential move of the shipper given the logistics service 
provider’s offer in pass 1, for situations of non-agreement in round 1. For Step 5 
and beyond, all logistics service providers have knowledge of the shipper’s 
preferred offer. We evaluate the shipper’s offer that may or may not be revised 
from pass 1, in the light of knowledge of the logistics service provider’s preferred 
offer (which is different to that of the shipper in pass 1). We might include a 
variable representing the actual offer from the logistics service provider in the 
previous round. 
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• Step 6: Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the 
second sequential move offers, following the approach in Step 3. 
 
• Step 7: Calculate the expected utility matrix for the shipper and the logistics 
service provider and identify the cooperation probability for each alternative in 
pass 2. 
 
• Step 8: Second sequential move of the logistics service provider given the 
shipper’s revised or maintained offer in pass 2, for situations of non-agreement in 
round 2. We evaluate the logistics service provider’s offer that may or may not be 
revised from pass 2, in the light of knowledge of the shipper’s preferred offer 
(which is different to that of the logistics service provider in pass 2). We include a 
variable representing the actual offer from the logistics service provider in the 
previous round. 
 
• Step 9: Evaluate the influences on the pass agreement (1,0) outcome for the third 
sequential move offers, following the approach in Step 3. 
 
• Step10: Calculate the expected utility matrix for the shipper and the logistics 
service provider and identify the cooperation probability for each alternative in 
pass 3. 
 
The process continues subject to the number of steps required to achieve a cooperative 
outcome and the limits on sample size for model estimation. 
 
 
6. Data Needs 
 
The data requirements for revealing empirically the formation of preferences which 
guide the decision-making process leading to choice outcomes in the presence of 
interactive agents are an order of magnitude more demanding than what we require for 
independent agents. The complexity is as much due to the myriad of possible ways in 
which agents interact with feedback and negotiation leading to an ‘equilibrium’ set of 
preferences as it is due to the logistics of collecting data in which interaction and 
feedback between agents is required. Whether in time we can skip to the equilibrium 
setting8 and avoid the preference formation stage remains to be seen. Until we know 
what decision-chain’s of agents occur in the context of making a single (cooperative) 
choice as well as the membership of consideration and choice sets, and the probability 
of membership of each alternative decision-chain, sampling of appropriate persons to 
interview is not possible9.  
 
                                                          
8 This point was discussed extensively by the author and Axel Boersch-Supan in 1998 when developing a 
contemporaneous model form for interactive agency (unpublished). We suggested that for most 
applications that the final choice outcome is all that is of interest. The downside of this however is that we 
might fail to reveal the barriers that may create non-cooperative outcomes or even cooperative outcomes 
that are not necessarily the preferred outcome for one or more agents but is arrived at as a consequence of 
beliefs about the influence and power of other agents in the group.  Hence the equilibrium choice 
outcome is in a sense a non-optimal one for specific subsets of agents.  
9 Anything is in one sense possible but not recommended. One could screen to establish who to interview 
or even interview ‘everyone’ and try and establish influence and power at a later stage.  
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Whom do we need to interview and how in households and firms? When sampling 
combinations of respondents, the proper unit of analysis for the study of interactions is 
the decision-chain or group and not the individuals that comprise the group. Hence the 
sampling unit is interactive agents. Identifying who should be included in the agency set 
really depends on who participates in the process leading to a choice outcome. This 
involvement can be passive or active. In a household setting, given the object of choice 
(eg vehicle type and number, residential location, distributed work practices) one might 
relatively easily start with a series of questions designed to reveal who makes a 
contribution to the choice outcome in an endogenous sense of interactivity. We would 
exclude individuals who are exogenous constraints (eg children) unless they actually 
influence the choice outcome endogenously through bringing to the table their own 
preferences, influence and power. Sometimes this influence can be active; other times it 
might be passive. In the context of a business, the appropriate participant(s) becomes 
more complex, possibly involving more than one person in one or more organizations.   
 
Establishing participation eligibility is a major task and one in which extensive 
discussion within an organisation is required. In the telecommuting study (Brewer and 
Hensher 2001, Rose and Hensher 2002), we allocated considerable resources to 
discussions within an organization to identify eligible agents (subsequently paired to 
represent employee and immediate supervisor), using subjective priors on the location 
of influence and power (resting in the immediate supervisor). However we subsequently 
noted that even the immediate supervisor is constrained to varying degrees by their 
supervisor and hence their preferences as revealed in the IACE were in part constrained 
by their expectations of support from their immediate supervisor. How far one goes to 
capture these additional effects should be guided primarily about their impact of the 
formation of preferences and the equilibrium choice outcome. There are no simple rules 
here, only guiding principles. The extent of the decision chain is likely to vary by the 
choice under examination. The opportunities for research endeavour on this theme alone 
are substantial. 
 
It is currently an open question as to whether data collection can be undertaken using 
methods other than face-to-face. While an internet-based strategy has enormous appeal, 
given the steep learning curve at this juncture, we promote a face-to-face strategy. The 
subtleties of interaction may well be missed via other data collection media. We are 
currently trialling email on a logistics project involving paired participants in two 
countries involved in the transport and display of rare artworks. Although this will 
establish if email is viable, it does not guarantee the full evaluation of suitable 
information for modelling choice outcomes. Only the in-depth face-to-face strategy is 
likely to establish suitable benchmarks for determining information compromises 
through less direct data collection paradigms.  
 
Having determined which agents will participate in the data collection process, one 
needs to decide whether each agent is interviewed sequentially with/without feedback or 
simultaneously. If sequential, the order of agency exposure and feedback may be 
crucial. This may be reasonably clear in some settings (such as the telecommuting study 
of Brewer and Hensher (2000) where the employee might reasonably be the first agent 
in the sequence); however in general the sequence is by no means obvious. Does it 
really matter if feedback is included? Possibly to a lesser extent than if no feedback, but 
this is worthy of empirical investigation. Does first-exposure of preferences condition 
subsequent preferences of each agent or not? The simultaneous paradigm avoids this 
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issue (to some extent) but has its downside where agents tend not to discuss as a group 
but prefer to put their position (ie choice preference) to other agents for consideration 
(avoiding direct negotiation)10.   Even in a simultaneous setting, specific agents can 
force their views early as a reflection of influence and power. To measure such 
influence during data acquisition is essential. The big question is – how best to capture 
such influence and power? What measurement scale is appropriate? The Dellaert et al 
(1998) paper offers one appealing metric to project the preferences of other individuals 
in a family as a basis of each agent’s perceptions of the preferences of the other agents: 
 
"Firstly, please evaluate each [travel] package by rating it on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 = very 
unattractive to 10 =very attractive) based on your own individual preference for the choice situations. 
Secondly, also rate each package as you think your wife and child [/ your husband and child/ your 
father and mother] would rate the package, by giving two more ratings that you think best represent 
their individual preferences." 
 
Whether this is adequate to reveal power and influence is an interesting research 
question, but it does at least reveal useful information that may condition each agent’s 
own preferences and choice outcomes, cooperative or non-cooperative.  As an example 
of a stated choice survey instrument, we reproduce in Table 4 a showcard used in the 
telecommuting study of Brewer and Hensher (2001). The design of an SC experiment is 
no more complex than single agent instruments, even though the collection strategy is 
different. The showcard and choice response moves between the agents until there is 
agreement (or the experiment concludes). The wording on an attribute will differ for 
employee and employer. For example, in Table 4, for an employer on the productivity 
attribute we would say “If an employee telecommutes their productivity will be….”. 
 
Table 4. Example Show card for a Stated Choice Experiment  
(employee wording for each attribute) 
 
 Telecommuting One Day a Week 
Telecommuting 
Two Days a Week 
If I telecommute, the level of contact 
necessary with other people for my 
work would be …. 
Lower Lower 
If I telecommute, the amount of 
control I have over my work would be 
…. 
Lower Lower 
If I telecommute, my personal 
productivity will be ….. Lower Lower 
If I telecommute access to information 
necessary for my job would be .… Location-dependent Location-dependent 
If I telecommute, my career prospects 
will be …. Lower Lower 
 
Contact 0=Lower, 1=Unchanged, 2=Higher 
Control 0=Lower, 1=Unchanged, 2=Higher  
Productivity 0=Lower, 1=Unchanged, 2=Higher 
                                                          
10 It is interesting to note how email correspondence is often much different to face to face verbal 
dialogue. Anecdotally, we see agents saying things by email that they dare not say face to face. They may 
regret what they say in time, but they feel mote secure at a distance in saying it. 
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Information 0=Location- dependent, 1=Limited away from the work place, 
2=Location independent 
Career  0=Lower, 1=Unchanged, 2=Higher 
 
 
7. The Urban Freight Distribution Task: Towards the 
Development of the Interactive Organisational Choice 
Process in a Supply Chain 
 
“Documented evidence in the international supply chains proves collaboration 
provides far superior results for all participants…..If the transport industry fails 
to respond, frustrated customers may follow a trend currently being experienced 
in the US. It will be a new competitor, but not a 4PL” (Coates 2002) 
 
Despite the significance of freight to our daily lives, few of us understand its importance 
(or we take it for granted) and fewer still understand the complexity involved 
throughout the decision chain in sourcing, purchasing, packing, moving, storing, and 
delivering freight. There are a number of challenges that must be met head on. These 
include: 
 
• The need to establish a united view on freight logistics issues of mutual interest. 
The traditional modal interests must be developed into a multi-modal view and 
combined with the interests of non-transport operators to address freight logistics 
issues at a higher level than is currently the case. A united industry approach 
requires leadership and a fundamental shift in industry culture to address the new 
drivers of economic success – knowledge and relationships. Multi-modalism 
behaviourally translates into an interactive agency problem and decision chains. 
 
• Inadequate freight logistics infrastructure in key parts of the transport network, 
resulting in increased transport costs and the inability of some businesses to 
access the full range of freight logistics services available to their competitors. 
 
Research into the movement of urban freight is best focused within a supply chain 
setting, adding a new perspective on what choices have to be studied, formalised and 
modelled. A supply chain (decision chain or decision network) is formally a set of 
linkages that involve participation by agents, elements, relations and mechanisms. 
Within the freight transport context, an agent is a shipper or a transport provider, an 
element is a commodity or a vehicle, a relation is one between a commodity and the 
vehicle technology used to deliver it, and a mechanism is a choice such as routing or 
timing of delivery. The interactions between these four dimensions of a supply chain 
define the urban freight distribution task (Boerkamps et al 2000, Russo and Comi 2001).  
 
This task involves more than traditional transport decisions such as trip timing, routing, 
choice of vehicle type, etc.; it also requires an understanding of how each agent in the 
supply chain chooses to interact with other agents (or go it alone) and which subset of 
decisions and attributes matter to them in the 'chain alliance'. This suggests a focus on a 
hierarchical structure that starts with understanding the way in which each agent 
chooses membership of a supply chain. There are many supply chain structures, 
Models of Organisational and Agency Choices for Passenger and Freight-Related Travel Choices: 
Notions of Inter-Activity and Influence 
Hensher 
17 
including a single-agent chain where the shipper, forwarder, and distributor are one and 
the same; a two-link chain comprising a shipper and a forwarder and so on.  Knowing 
the structure (and modelling membership) of the supply chain is critical in tracking the 
agents who make the various decisions that define the freight distribution task. Very 
little data have been collected on this issue, apart from some narrowly-defined case 
studies. Data pertaining to a comprehensive overview of all supply chains appear not to 
exist. Identification of the relevant decision variables is of great importance, particularly 
because some may be outside the distribution system, such as marketing requirements. 
 
The choice of a supply chain structure will be influenced by the attributes that are 
important to each agent and how each potential member of a supply chain can deliver 
these attribute levels to the satisfaction of other agents seeking out a preferred supply 
chain structure. Here the notion of influence is important. A good descriptive model of 
supply chain structures should include two sets of channels: marketing and physical 
distribution. A marketing channel is a string of actors that, as a group, perform all 
actions to interconnect producers and consumers aimed at fulfilling the marketing task. 
Actors can be producers, trade intermediaries or retailers. Within each marketing 
channel, several physical distribution channels can be used to deliver the goods. The 
structure of freight flows is dependent on two successive choices: that of marketing 
channel(s) followed by selection of a physical distribution channel. Once the 
behavioural choice of a supply chain is known and formalised we then have a 
framework within which to start detailing the formation of choice sets and the matrix of 
choice components and associated attributes. This is where we start thinking about the 
transport choices such as selection of vehicle type, routing, and timing and the role of 
specific attributes such as cost, damage minimisation, reliability, and other transactions 
costs. The role of each choice and attribute for each agent will vary depending on the 
supply chain structure. For example, if an intermediary is involved then maybe the 
shipper does not care about specific attributes such as travel time and routing as long as 
goods arrive at an agreed time. Thus although the shipper initiated the freight activity 
another agent in the supply chain decides on routing and timing.  An interactive agency 
perspective is appropriate in revealing the role of agents in the transport distribution 
task and hence who needs to provide preference data. 
 
The most important behavioural aspects that shape freight transportation are contained 
in the markets for infrastructure, commodities, transport services and traffic services11.  
The infrastructure market decides on infrastructure supply given traffic demand; the 
commodity market determines goods flows, connecting goods demand and supply via 
supply chains; the transport services market results in commodity movements between 
places by transport modes by connecting commodity flows with their logistics demands 
                                                          
11 For all supply chain settings, urban freight distribution involves (at least) five components of freight 
movement and their four interacting markets. The components are: (1) the spatial organisation of 
activities which describes the location of facilities, where goods are produced and consumed, and where 
people live and work. (2) The commodity market which connects demand and supply of goods resulting 
in trade relations between the origins and destinations of goods. (3) Transport services that are needed to 
facilitate the demand for goods transport. These services include vehicles and terminal facilities together 
with the spatial and temporal patterns of freight flows classified by consolidation profile (containers, 
pallets, boxes, etc.). (4) The traffic system supplies infrastructure which is used by vehicles in delivering 
transport services. (5) The availability of infrastructure which is a basic condition to meet traffic 
demands. The capacity of links and nodes in the (road) infrastructure network and the traffic flows 
(passenger and freight) on the network are interdependent resulting in capacity adjustments and/or 
congestion feedbacks (e.g., changes in route and trip scheduling). 
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to the available transport modes (including truck types) and services; and the traffic 
services market deals with vehicle movements on the infrastructure, resulting in 
network loads. All four markets are important. Understanding the commodity and 
transport services markets better will enable us to 'feed' the infrastructure and traffic 
services markets with the real behavioural basis for commodity and vehicle movements.  
 
We can classify decision makers into two broad classes: shippers (those with ownership 
rights on the commodities which can be the manufacturer or even an intermediary) and 
transport providers (those responsible for collecting, moving and delivering goods to 
final consumers or warehouses).  The shipper and the transport provider represent the 
main actors involved in the production and consumption of goods, the shippers routing 
of freight, the determination of freight rates and the carriers routing of the freight traffic 
(Friesz 2000). There is gap in our understanding the key decisions made by the shipper 
and transport provider in moving goods between two spatial locations (an origin and a 
final destination). The shipper has goods that need delivery – this defines the initial 
origin and final destination of the goods – and also has preferences that dictate what 
matters to the shipper in deciding on how best to move their goods. The transport 
provider determines how best to move the goods between their origin and destination 
which may involve trip chaining between various initial, intermediate and final 
destinations. The set of choices/decisions to be made and associated attributes relevant 
to the shipper and to the transport provider are not the same set. Shippers are mostly 
concerned with efficient operation of marketing channels, while transport providers are 
mostly concerned with efficient operation of distribution channels. There must however 
be an overlapping set of attributes that form the basis of a contract between the two or 
more agents in the supply chain to secure the movement of goods. This interface is an 
the centre of the IACE approach. 
 
The key relationships between agents, freight distribution channels and supply chains 
are summarised in Table 5.  Supply Chains (SC1,…,SC4) are examples of the freight 
distribution channels and agents. SC4 for example, involves a freight forwarder in all 
channels of freight distribution and so is the only agent to study. The decisions made by 
the freight forwarder would determine the profile of traffic on the network in respect of 
vehicle type, routing and time of day.  Thus, given a specific supply chain structure, the 
appropriate agents responsible for freight distribution will be identified as well as their 
degree of influence, and then we have to establish what set of transport-related decisions 
they consider and what attributes influence the choice made for each transport-related 
decision. The transport related decisions of potential interest are summarised in Table 6.  
An origin can define a particular consignment or an aggregation of similar 
consignments from a single enterprise (e.g., a factory or warehouse) or all entities in the 
same geographical location (e.g., a Port).  A knowledge of the movement of a specific 
consignment from a specific location, by a vehicle type, by time of day, by route to a 
specific destination in the distribution channel (i.e., P➞DC➞W➞R➞IS/C) and the 
associated decision maker in each freight distribution link (e.g., P➞DC, W➞R) provides 
the necessary information to model the behavioural dimensions of the urban freight 
distribution task.  
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Table 5. Alternative Supply Chain Structures with respect to Freight Distribution 
 
Notes: Agents: Shippers {Producer (P), Distribution Centre (DC), Wholesaler (W), 
Retailer (R), Final Consumer (C), Internet Shopper (IS)} and Transport providers 
(Freight Forwarder FF).  Freight Distribution (FD): FD1= P➞W or P➞DC➞W; FD2 = 
W➞R; FD3 = R➞IS or R➞C. 
 
Supply Chain Profiles 
( __ = agent providing 
freight distribution) 
Freight  
Distribution FD1 
Freight 
Distribution FD2 
Freight  
Distribution FD3 
SC1 P     ➞    W W    ➞     R R    ➞     IS 
SC2 P     ➞   DC  ➞   W W    ➞     R R    ➞    C 
SC3 P     ➞   W FF FF (R  ➞  IS) 
SC4 FF FF FF 
Note: C is a passenger trip whereas IS is a freight trip. 
 
Table 6. Main Behavioural Choices in the Distribution-Focussed Supply Chain 
 
Amount of commodity by type to move (tonnes or items) from origin (production) 
Shipment characteristics (size, value, fragility, special features) from origin (inventory 
specs) 
Frequency of shipments from origin (inventory specs) 
Vehicle type(s) required for shipments from origin 
Departure time of trips (ie scheduling) 
Vehicle trip chaining choice (simple vs complex chains) (consolidation issue for FTL 
and LTL) 
Routing of vehicles from origin to destination 
Origin-destination movement by commodity, vehicle type and departure time 
 
Certain types of commodity movements are often combined with other shipments to 
produce a Less-than-Truck-Load (LTL) activity involving many destinations; for other 
commodities, a Full-Truck Load (FTL) is appropriate. The LTL/FTL distinction has 
important implications for choices made. An LTL configuration is a more complex trip 
chaining activity than an FTL (Hensher and Reyes 2000).  For each behavioural choice 
made by a shipper and/or a transport provider, we need to identify the set of alternatives 
and the attributes that drive the selection of an alternative. Table 7 summarises attributes 
likely to be important in the selection of a supply chain (SC1,…,SC4) and in the choice 
of routing, timing, consolidation, vehicle type, etc.  
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Table 7. Attributes of Interest to Specific Agents in the Supply Chain 
 
Freight Movements and Commercial Services 
Shipper  
(What does the transport 
provider deliver): 
Transport Provider  
(What does the road 
environment deliver): 
Possible Explanatory 
Variables 
Reliability Reliability On-time requirements 
Damage/risk minimisation 
 
Damage/risk minimisation of 
vehicle and goods (ride 
quality) 
Fragility and theft 
sensitivity of commodities 
Cost /Rates Tolls and vehicle running 
costs 
Tariffs 
Transactions time Transactions Time   
Delivery time Delivery Time Lead time 
 Perceived Safety  
 
There will exist a set of attributes that are relevant to the shipper and a set that are 
relevant to the transport business. The shipper may focus more on the service attributes 
(e.g., reliability, damage) and cost (in a generic sense), with limited interest in how the 
transport provider moves the goods (i.e. vehicle type, routing, scheduling), as long as 
the goods arrive when and in the condition agreed for the freight rate struck.  
 
To capture these behavioural relationships and formally model the interdependencies 
between them across the supply chain requires the following tasks:  
 
• The conceptual and theoretical foundations of the relationships between the key 
agents and associated decisions that impact on the freight distribution task. 
 
• The theoretical design of stated choice (SC) experiments (together with revealed 
preference data on an existing decision-chain) that recognise the interactive nature 
of the key agents in the distribution of goods in an urban area.  These designs will 
include the choice between supply chain structures involving various 
combinations of producer-wholesaler-retailer-consumer interactions and the role 
of each agent in the linkages between each adjacent agent, especially shipper and 
transport provider. The SC designs should pivot off the currently identified supply 
chain structure for each agent. 
 
• The empirical design of interactive agency stated choice experiments to establish 
a way of identifying how shipper and transport provider process relevant 
information on specific choices and associated attributes and interact with the 
other agent(s) to arrive at a cooperative outcome (i.e., action to move urban goods 
by a specific supply chain). 
 
• Having identified alternative supply chain structures and the embedded set of 
choices made by each agent and their associated attributes, one needs to set up a 
formal econometric modelling system having the capability of handling the 
complex error and correlation structures that will exist when integrating choice 
sequences made by interacting agents (along the lines set out in Section 4).  
Models of Organisational and Agency Choices for Passenger and Freight-Related Travel Choices: 
Notions of Inter-Activity and Influence 
Hensher 
21 
• Estimation and interpretation of alternative model paradigms based on an 
investigative stated choice survey for a specific commodity segment.  
 
The key relationships are succinctly summarised in Figure 1. To estimate a set of supply 
chain and freight distribution models empirically requires identification of relatively 
homogeneous market sub-segments such as general carrier and specialist commodities. 
The selection might be based on the following premises: 
 
• The sectors should represent a sizeable amount of urban freight movement 
activity.  
 
• The full range of vehicle types should be covered by the sectors, ranging from 
rigid small vans through to large double articulated trucks. 
 
• The trip chaining routing should include simple one-stop activity for specialist 
commodities and multiple stops for general carriers so as to represent the diversity 
of spatial activity and the mix of hot and cold starts for air quality impact 
assessment. 
 
• The inclusion of general carriers can represent couriers, a big component of urban 
freight vehicle activity, to some extent (small vans). 
 
• That a sufficient number of popular supply chain structures can be observed 
enabling a rich analysis of the choice amongst such decision network structures.  
 
• The behavioural modelling should as a minimum focus on the two crucial 
elements of choice of vehicle technology and choice of routing (trip chain). The 
latter can be linked back to the spatial outcomes so crucial for identifying spatial 
patterns of vehicle movements and hence the key performance outputs such as 
greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution, congestion and transport financial 
costs.  
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Figure 1. Schematic Overview of an Integrated Freight Distribution System 
 
Note: For each FDij|SC and Vehicle Type, Probodtr = (Probr|odt * Probt|od * Probd|o*Probo) 
* Prob vtype 
Summation across all FDs, SCs and Vtypes provide an origin-destination trip table by 
time of day and routing. 
 
 
 
It is essential that one samples by service class or freight commodity, simply because 
this influences the importance weights attached to the attributes in a significant way. For 
example, shippers of perishable vegetables will place a much higher relative weight on 
damage minimisation and on time delivery than shippers of bulk coal who might focus 
more on freight rates. Services such as a courier will focus on travel time and reliability 
and possibly perceived safety. 
 
A mixture of revealed and stated preference data is desirable, sourced from a face to 
face survey (see Louviere et al 2000). The revealed preference (RP) data would 
represent a specific consignment recently completed in which details are sought on the 
vehicle technology and trip routing, delivery and commodity profile. A distinction 
between at least two levels of attributes is desirable– tactical and strategic. The former 
relate to expected loading factors and local limitations (e.g., length restrictions, 
prohibitions of heavy vehicles on certain roads, etc.), while the latter relate to 
distribution concepts, (e.g., range and number of distribution centres). The SC data 
should involve variations around the RP levels of key attributes that require SC 
enrichment to ensure sufficient variability in the attribute levels for establishment of 
consistent and efficient parameter estimates. This enrichment process enables the 
analyst to keep data collection costs down through increasing the amount of information 
per sampled trip. Identifying the relevant individuals in an organisation to interview is 
always a challenge (as discussed in section 6), but in the urban freight context the 
SC1 (FD11,FD12,FD1j) SC2(FD21,FD22,FD2j)..........
FD11 FD12 FD1j
commodity origin
commodity destination
distribution time of day
Routing
Supply chain structures
vehicle 
type
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contenders are the logistics/transport manager for a shipper organisation and the general 
manager/client manager for the transport provider. 
 
 
8. Conclusions and Directions for Ongoing Research 
 
There is much to do in revealing the structure and performance of interactive agency 
decision-making leading to specific choice outcomes. Although there is a large and 
diverse literature in sociology, psychology, marketing and economics (in particular) that 
promotes notions of interactive decision making with a strong emphasis on group 
formation and decisions, there is an apparent dearth of empirical frameworks that have 
the capability of quantifying the influences of one of more interacting agents and the 
specific mechanisms for revealing the role of each agent’s preferences in arriving at 
choice outcomes. Conceptual frameworks abound but do little in translation to 
modelling frameworks capable of embellishing the travel behaviour model systems that 
currently exist. This paper has offered some directions for the continuing research 
program.  
 
Establishing new modelling paradigms is one big challenge; but equally challenging is 
defining the data requirements including what types of data to obtain, who to source 
data from, how best to collect such data and what sampling strategies are appropriate. 
These will remain high agenda research themes for the immediate future.  
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